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Our discipline has always required great care. Balancing one’s ethical duties to re-
search participants and colleagues, to readers, reviewers, and editors, and now with 
open access to the general public—while striving for an intellectual honesty above 
all—presents us with no simple task. The intimacy of doing the anthropology of 
institutions in Europe as an anthropologist in a European institution just makes 
these duties of care more visible and pronounced. For this reason the article’s moral 
ambivalence is vital. It is as necessary to do justice to a Teutonic relation as it is to 
represent its potential for injustice. Whether it succeeds is another matter. One 
interesting effect of this ambivalence since the article’s publication earlier this year 
however, has been to produce very different inferences in the minds of its readers. 
Such diversity is well reflected in the considered responses from Julie Billaud, Cris 
Shore, and Christoph Brumann.
Billaud enriches the debate with a comparative ethnographic think piece on the 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. In the process she explores her own 
“overwhelming feeling of boredom”—a move that may dismay my interlocutors 
in the natural sciences who perpetually stressed the importance of “excitement.” 
An Institute saturated with boredom is quite against the Society’s own self-image. 
Billaud defends her desire for enchantment against what might be considered a 
“naive and utopian vision,” but in fact she would be in good company elsewhere in 
the Society. Scientists I knew echoed her citation of Bateson, telling me their work 
consisted of “playing around.” So yes, my interlocutors may be dismayed; on the 
other hand, they would not be surprised. While the directors I worked with were 
generally popular, there were always veiled references to when “the system does not 
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work,” to other Institutes where the directors narrowed the autonomy of their sci-
entists and hierarchy segued into control. (This is of course implicit in Axel’s claim 
that the director “could be a king if he wanted to.”) While the affect of boredom she 
explores is counter-cultural in one sense, in Billaud’s ethnography it still remains 
the outcome of personalized leadership—a value that consistently out-trumps any 
other.
What we might also glean from Billaud’s brave offering is that our moral cri-
tiques are misplaced. Social theory in the wake of ’68 has been consistent in its 
attack on the legitimacy of hierarchical relations (Peacock 2015), yet it is not hier-
archy as such that produces Billaud’s affects of constraint. It is the way a hierarchi-
cal relation is translated into the exertion of control through bureaucratic tech-
nologies; as in one sense or another, all of her examples concern the allocation of 
resources. The fact is that egalitarian systems can execute the same translation. 
Shore’s perspicacious comparison between directors and “project barons” is salient 
here because it is through the exertion of resource control that directorship be-
gins to adopt characteristics of neoliberal governmentality. Billaud’s “experience of 
stuckedness” echoes the hollowing delay that audit culture produces: one in which 
the charisma of the present is perpetually put on hold in service to some future 
imperative. Just publish a book and you will have financial security. Just win a grant 
and you will be promoted. Sometimes these imperatives are so deafening that we 
can scarcely hear what each other is substantively saying. If something quasi-feudal 
can so closely resemble something neoliberal, then the moral issue at stake is not 
one of how to organize people but of these bureaucratic techniques that make a 
bland mask for domination.
In contrast to Billaud’s concern with affect, Shore’s lucid commentary takes an 
economistic view. For Shore, dependence is equivalent to “a disguised form of class 
relationship”: in which “structural violence” produces an “underclass of subaltern 
researchers.” He then poses the important question as to whether the neoliberal-
ization of academia is entrenching these asymmetries—particularly through the 
project barons commanding large public sums. Shore’s scholarly suggestion is to 
resituate the argument within a 1960s literature on patron-client relations: with 
dependence negotiated by its incumbents as “a calculated exchange relationship 
and investment strategy.”
While I appreciate the ethnography can be read in this way, I hesitate to fol-
low this kind of economic thinking. Indeed the article as a whole and the thesis 
from which it is drawn position themselves as arguments against it. At its base 
the language of class suggests two groups in opposing relations to the means of 
production, with different personal access to its resources and the perennial threat 
of conflict. The picture in the MPS is not this. Directors are of course scientists 
themselves, a sameness that softens their hierarchical difference. Similarly, both are 
salaried workers on pay scales not wildly dissimilar (certainly nothing like the dif-
ferentials between professors and university provosts). Intrahierarchical conflict is 
also very muted. It could be, as Brumann proposes, that all parties are simply “used 
to” the norms of dependence. Yet my ethnography would suggest that when people 
are suspended in a relation of complementarity this robust, it can make the rupture 
that political action requires very difficult. The most viable option, as evidenced 
by Benjamin (and indeed Billaud it would seem), is to “exit” the organization 
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completely (Hirschman 1970): one clearly assisted by the precariatization of its 
workforce. These are not then class antagonisms but something much more sin-
ewed. Shore’s analogy with priesthood, mayoralty, and so on is highly apposite but 
not in the way they were analyzed in the 1960s. The problem with patron-client 
literature was always its transactionalism (cf. Piliavsky 2014). Social encounters 
start looking uncannily like the commodity-form, with their historicity lost and 
the desires that surround them instrumentalized. Faris is strategic but he is not 
instrumental; the difference is subtle but important.
Shore is right to raise the question of gender. The demographics of directorship 
are overwhelmingly androcentric. At the time of research in 2011 there were just 22 
female directors out of a total of 286, with an even smaller ratio in the hard sciences 
I studied. Moreover, the Society’s statutes fail to problematize the use of “he” as a 
gender-neutral term. Yet the fact that there are female directors complicates the is-
sue. The directorship was not (as it was among many varieties of technical staff) an 
exclusively homosocial position. Having not worked with any female director, I was 
not positioned to draw conclusions on gender and directorship. Clearly the issue of 
gender requires further research. For now I will leave these conclusions to a female 
senior social scientist inside the MPS, who reflected on a comparison I once made 
between directors and big-men and -women: “I am afraid it is about big men even 
where (big) women are concerned,” she demurred.
Finally, I must address the commentary of Brumann, who is also a permanent 
Max Planck employee. As with Billaud, Brumann offers an alternative analysis 
predicated on the deep knowledge of the insider. He adds important details on 
German labor law and the impact of some of the media coverage cited in the ar-
ticle on the MPS itself. It is encouraging to see this insider accept unhesitatingly 
two major struts of the argument, namely that “autonomy builds on precarity” 
and that dependency within the Max Planck Society is not a specifically “neo-
liberal product.” Brumann goes even further than my own claims to suggest that 
the article “explains part of a much broader phenomenon of academic precarity.” 
Nonetheless, this final remark is also the critique that gives his commentary its 
overall shape.
Brumann states that the argument “isolates and rarefies” the Max Planck Soci-
ety too much, denying its significant historical and contemporary overlaps with the 
university system. Yet through such assertions Brumann is pursuing a syllogistic 
fallacy: specifically, one drawing a negative conclusion from an affirmative prem-
ise. Brumann is extrapolating my statements on the Max Planck Society to infer 
that these statements apply to only the Max Planck Society. Indeed, this is belied 
by the very first footnote (which he cites explicitly), as well as my extensive appeal 
to Fritz Ringer. Intriguingly, Brumann follows the same fallacy in his comments 
around the Betriebsrat. At no point in the article do I suggest that the Betriebsrat is 
singular to the Max Planck Society, nor its own “invention.” An interesting ques-
tion comes next—why would Brumann make this errors of logic? Here I would 
suggest the surging spirit of the organization is at work. For its sense of its own 
exceptionalism—interpellated in the discourses of autonomy and excellence—oc-
cupies the very heart of the organization’s collective identity. When Brumann as-
serts that the essay “isolates and rarefies,” he is ventriloquizing the Society’s own 
vision of itself as isolated and rarefied. When he claims I consider the Betriebsrat a 
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Max Planck invention, he conveys the Society’s conviction of its own inventiveness. 
This notwithstanding, I welcome Brumann’s demonstrations of the porosity of this 
hierarchical form with other German institutions. This is precisely the broader res-
onance that I had hoped others might pursue. As with any work of scholarship, the 
validity of my conclusions extends only as far as the empirical ground they cover.
There are further points at which Brumann follows the ratiocinations of his col-
leagues. It is a commonplace within the organization that the Max Planck Society 
endures because it generates “results.” This is clearly echoed in Brumann’s claim 
that “the output in terms of publications, Nobel Prizes, ERC Advanced Grants, and 
the like has so far prevented German lawmakers and taxpayers from questioning 
the model.” That this were true! British Universities once won around a quarter of 
all ERC funding (Jump 2015), yet that did not prevent lawmakers from questioning 
the model. The Max Planck Society endures because it realizes key values articu-
lated during the German counter-Enlightenment, which so far have been success-
fully modernized. Only when these recalibrations lose their internal and external 
coherence will the organization fail or change significantly.
Before concluding I must highlight a point of contention and flat inaccuracy in 
Brumann’s response. He quite rightly notes that the direct translation of Betriebsrat 
is “works council,” yet the concept does not translate this easily for non-Germans. 
The function of the Betriebsrat—as one of their number informed me—is to “rep-
resent the interests of employees” and act as a “counterweight to the management.” 
This largely consists of mediating personal disputes and ensuring that the labor 
laws Brumann discusses are adhered to. For employees in other countries, unions 
would perform these tasks. One of the major differences is that a Betriebsrat cannot 
call a strike. What is lost in translation is however obviated by retaining the origi-
nal German; I then leave it to polyglot readers to translate the term their own way. 
Finally, I cannot claim the credit Brumann proffers for the “suggestive metaphor” 
of the stranger-king; that belongs to Marshall Sahlins.
I would sincerely like to thank all three readers for contributing to this debate, 
as well as Giovanni Da Col for initiating it. While performing our duties of care to 
diverse others, we must not then forget to attend to ourselves and our own rights 
as scholars to Billaud’s “surprise, poetic imagination, enchantment or puzzlement.”
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